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To be differently-gendered is to live within a discourse where other people are 
always investigating you, describing you, speaking for you; and putting as much 
distance as possible between the expert speaker and the deviant and therefore 
deficient subject. 
- Pat Califia (2) 
I n the social sciences, researchers, interviewers, and narrators of peoples' experiences present selective recordings of subjects' voices. This paper concentrates on the portrayal of transsexual 
narratives- with a particular focus on representations of one subject, 
Agnes- as they have been selectively constituted by social scientists. 
Agnes, a transsexual, participated in Harold Garfinkel's research in 
the late 1960s, making her the first subject of an in-depth discussion 
of transsexuality in sociology. I contend that a number of social 
scientists scrutinize and evaluate Agnes's and other transsexuals' 
narratives for 'truth', and frame transsexuality as a window into 
gender construction. At the same time, however, these social scientists 
mold Agnes's identity to illustrate particular theoretical positions 
and avoid examining their own investments in their subjects. As 
well, they neglect to consider their own ongoing reproductions of 
hegemonic gender relations. In this paper, I explore how social 
scientists might selectively record subjects' voices while remaining 
self-reflexive and committed to the integrity of the interviewee. 
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First, I link the sociological fascination with Agnes to the 
discipline's interest in 'Other ' sex and gender configurations, an 
interest that is frequently explored as a way to understand 'normal' 
gender arrangements in Western society. Second, I focus on how 
the example of Agnes is deployed, as social scientists both evaluate 
her self-narratives and unselfconsciously produce alternative 
'Agneses ' that exemplify their theoretical positions. Finally, I address 
ethical practice. Social scientists must recognize their investments 
in the examples they use. In particular, researchers need to identify 
and disrupt the Othering of research subjects by acknowledging 
everyone's implication in the production of gender. I conclude by 
arguing that while there is no ' true ' construction of Agnes, there is a 
person behind the examples, with her own lived experiences, within 
a particular set of material and discursive conditions, who must be 
respected. However, my intention in addressing the above points is 
not necessarily to unveil the 'real' Agnes. 
I too have investments in writing on this topic and these affect 
my own examination of the ways in which examples of Agnes are 
deployed. A sociologist by training, I hold deep-seated concerns with 
the discipline's need to categorize, to label, and to investigate the 
'Other,' particularly when these practices are upheld by the 
epistemological premise of an objective, detached observer. As a 
result of these concerns, I am drawn to the flexibility of 
interdisciplinarity, and to a postmodern skepticism with the 
'objectivity' and universalizing truth assertions of the social sciences. 
Examples are always invested. Thus, how we document and apply 
these examples is of great importance. I do not reject the potency of 
structured power relations , particularly since some groups and 
institutions - such as social science researchers within health care 
and educational institutions- have more authority than others in the 
production of discourse. These discourses in turn have material 
effects on people's lives. Transsexuals, as a marginal population, 
are particularly vulnerable to such effects. Finally, although not a 
transsexual, in trying to make sense oftranssexuality and how it has 
been taken up in sociological texts, I draw on my own confrontations 
with the dichotomous and often rigid categories of gay and straight, 
butch and femme, and man and woman. 
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Visiting the Other 
This section will focus on sociology's use of 'Others' to understand 
the 'normal' , with a particular emphasis on transsexuality and the 
study of gender. First, discourses sometimes use transsexual and 
transgender interchangeably. I focus on transsexualism since this is 
the primary concern of most of the texts under review. Transsexualism 
is defined as experiencing a Jack of correspondence between one's 
sense of gender and one's anatomical sex, and a response to this situation 
that might include sex-change surgery. Those who experience a lack 
of correspondence between their sex and their gender but who are 
not interested in sex change, and many who affiliate with a wider 
'trans ' movement, may define themselves as transgendered. 
Some sociologists, attempting to disrupt naturalized, 'commonsense' 
assumptions about Western cultural traditions, have employed spatial 
and temporal comparisons, particularly in terms of sex and gender. 
There is a tradition offeminist theorists using this comparative method 
to point to commonalities between cultures and to foreground 
divergences in cultural gender roles and sexual statuses (see esp. di 
Leonardo; Mead; Rubin; for discussion see Atkinson; Morris). Recently 
cross-cultural and cross-historical instances of 'homosexual' and 
'transsexual' behaviors have been deployed in the name of sex-gender 
scholarship (see esp. Anderson; Kessler & McKenna; Morris) . Here, 
some anthropologists ethnocentrically build their own assumptions 
about gender into their analyses of other cultures. For example, 
Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna maintain that anthropologists 
often interpret their observations of other cultures through the organizing 
concepts of their own. They expect to see two genders, each with an 
equivalent gender role, and therefore they do. In order to substantiate 
their claims, Kessler and McKenna point to literature on the berdache, 
a term that has been extended from North American Native cultures 
to many differently gendered social positions found in a number of 
cultures. They criticize the tendency in such literature to misdefine 
the berdache. For example, the terms 'transsexual' or 'hermaphrodite' 
are used to describe the berdache, and traits linked to the berdache 
are overgeneralized across cultures (see esp. Bolin ; Califia). In her 
article "Gender: Division or Comparison?" Marilyn Strathern explores 
several fundamentally different cultural conceptions of gender, 
conceptions that complicate attempts to identify any transcultural 
constructions of gender. The ethnocentric search for 'other' 
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transsexuals presupposes that different cultures can be understood 
through Western categories and systems of knowledge. 
Similarly, 'unusual' or 'deviant' persons and groups within 
Western society have attracted attention from generations of social 
scientists -as disruptions of cultural assumptions and testaments to 
human diversity. Robert K. Merton's article on anomie, Erving 
Goffman's Stigma, and Harold Garfinkel's essay on Agnes are three 
prominent sociological works that seek large scale social 
understanding by studying local, 'marginal' people. Social scientific 
interest in transsexualism and transgenderism often reflects this 
tradition of studying 'anomalies' (see Garfinkel; Hausman) based on 
the argument that "it is by studying how exceptions are accommodated 
that we can best understand the nonexceptional cases" (Kessler & 
McKenna 23). 
Unfortunately, these studies often frame the 'Other' as essentially 
different from, and inferior to, its 'normal' opposite (see Garfinkel; 
Hausman). The sociology of deviance, for example, despite some 
attention to the social construction and labeling of deviance (see 
Rubington and Weinberg, and Schissel and Mahood for edited 
collections), often remains voyeuristic and framed in the interests of 
social control (particularly when linked to criminology). Alexander 
Liazos's charge that it tends to reproduce presumed categories of 
'normal' and 'deviant' while ignoring the power relations behind these 
designations continues to be applicable today, particularly in that the 
life of the 'deviant' receives far more attention than questions 
regarding how 'normal' is defined, who designates the 'other', and 
what is at stake in these definitions. Transsexuality, of course, does 
not remain unscathed. 
These concerns are not limited to the field of the sociology of 
deviance. Queer theory also draws on transsexuality, adopting it, with 
transgenderism, as "a queer transgressive force" (Prosser 23). Jay 
Prosser argues that such an appropriation is problematic since first, 
transgenderism is not inherently queer- for example, Prosser states, 
not all transgendered people are homosexual and many of them seek 
not to be performative, but simply to be-and second, because it implies 
a "naturalness of sex" for the nontransgendered. Ki Namaste is also 
critical of queer theory - and Judith Butler's work in particular- for 
overemphasizing textual meanings and ignoring the material or lived 
realities of transsexual and transgendered people. Namaste looks to 
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the social sciences for preferred methodology, particularly the works 
of ethnomethodologists Harold Garfinkel, and Susanne Kessler and 
Wendy McKenna, who are reexamined here. Like Namaste, I am 
concerned with research that undermines "the lives and experiences 
of the transgendered people they study" ( 185), but as my following 
discussion of Agnes suggests, I do not see social science 
methodologies as immune to this tendency. 
Introducing Agnes 
A large chapter of Garfinkel's Studies in Ethnomethodology is devoted 
to Agnes, a transsexual woman who was introduced to Garfinkel by 
Dr. Robert Stoller, the physician who documented and supervised 
treatment. While Stoller is most interested in the etiology and 
treatment of transsexuality, Garfinkel studies the methods Agnes uses 
to negotiate daily life. 
According to Garfinkel, Agnes was born with male physical 
attributes and raised as male, yet all the while she knew herself to be 
female. When Garfinkel first met her, she had a penis and testicles in 
conjunction with secondary female characteristics such as breasts. 
At seventeen she began dressing and acting as the woman that she 
knew herself to be. She wanted to have the penis removed and replaced 
with a vagina. Garfinkel uses Agnes as an example for 
ethnomethodology. He examines the methods Agnes uses to pass as 
a woman, or to live successfully as a woman in a context in which 
there is "the possibility of detection and ruin" due to the "socially 
structured conditions" in which the passing occurs (Garfinkel 118). 
He is interested in Agnes's passing in order to examine the 
construction of gender and the methods individuals use to perform 
it. To him, Agnes's transsexualism is a mechanism through which 
the performance of 'normal' gender/sex can be understood. Garfinkel 
assumes that when a person undergoes a sex change, they must adjust 
to a new set of rules and behavioral expectations. To perform their 
new gender successfully, they must excel at the task of simultaneously 
learning and living a new gender. The energy that Agnes spent 
negotiating her own passing and appeasing her own fear of exposure 
illustrates the ubiquitous and threatening presence of gender as an 
institutionalized moral 'fact', a 'commonsense' notion that is taken 
for granted by 'normals,' considered the legitimate order, and policed 
through social sanctions. 
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Garfinkel's Studies in Ethnomethodology includes an epilogue 
which reports that, five years after Garfinkel's research, Agnes 
approached Robert Stoller with a number of changes to her personal 
history. As we shall see below, these changes became a site of scrutiny. 
Agnes's identity has been incorporated into literatures as diverse 
as ethnomethodology, feminism, queer theory, and social psychology. 
The remainder of this paper will focus on two interrelated themes. 
First, I consider how some researchers respond to Agnes's changing 
story, particularly as they are concerned with her truthfulness and 
self-fashioning (and the truthfulness and self-fashioning of other 
transsexuals). Second, I consider how the example of Agnes is 
produced by such researchers in pursuit of their own theoretical 
positions. 
Truth and Self-Fashioning 
To Garfinkel, Agnes's later disclosure was simply another example 
to illustrate how she used "rational accountability" (288) to bolster 
her practical accomplishments. When activities are organized in 
familiar, accountable ways, then they are accepted by others (including 
Garfinkel) . Truthfulness (or not) is secondary. For the most part, 
Garfinkel seems to accept Agnes's accounts, asserting that for her to 
Jive her life as she does, she must lie. Yet despite his sympathies, 
Garfinkel's observations foreground Agnes's dissembling. 
Garfinkel twice observes that "Her accounts exaggerated the 
evidences of her natural femininity and suppressed evidences of 
masculinity" ( 120). Later, he states that "she was a highly 
accomplished liar" ( 17 4 ). Further, he points out seven areas that Agnes 
would not discuss, including any interest in boys' activities when she 
was young, or her possible use of hormones prior to the research 
(implying Garfinkel's suspicions that she was hiding information). 
In an ironic twist, he also states: "She wanted to know as well whether 
[more research] would help 'the doctors' to get the 'true facts'. I 
asked Agnes, 'What do you figure the facts are?' She answered, 'what 
do I figure the facts are, or what do I think everyone else thinks the 
facts are?"' (175). Here Agnes is fully aware of the need to self-
fashion in the face of others' versions of what should be the truth. 
Furthermore, Garfinkel notices that Agnes uses "anticipatory 
following" (147) in some of her discussions with him: he believes 
that she attempts to gather clues from him about what kind of answer 
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he seeks in order to provide him with the information that she suspects 
he wishes to hear. Garfinkel is aware that he may be asking leading 
questions but does not seem able to acknowledge that those questions 
might also be constructed through his role in maintaining traditional 
dichotomous gender relations. 
Is Garfinkel judging Agnes's truthfulness? He claims to be 
interested only in Agnes's strategies for learning femininity while 
living as a woman. A less charitable reading might dwell on the 
implications of foregrounding strategies which suggest that Agnes 
and other 'gender transgressors' must lie, when both the gendering 
of all self-narratives and the anticipatory following that everyone 
does tend to remain unexamined. Certainly, in his other work, 
Garfinkel is interested in people's methods for negotiating daily life 
in a number of areas . My point is that by foregrounding Agnes's 
need to dissemble as she performs gender, the invisibility of everyone 
else's gender dissembling, including Garfinkel's, may be deepened 
rather than lessened. 
In fact, others are much more concerned with Agnes's 'true' story. 
Norman Denzin is obsessed with narrating the 'truth' and 
consequently presenting an Agnes who lies. In reporting her story, 
Denzin footnotes certain 'corrections' based on her later interviews 
with Stoller. For example, he states: "Now another lie appears in the 
text: she told Stoller that she did play with boys, was excellent in 
sports, and thought of herself as a boy" (206). Denzin thinks that 
Garfinkel was fooled by Agnes, because he refused to see beyond 
her story to consider the role of her "wild" sexuality. According to 
Denzin, Garfinkel thus misses the psychoanalytic reading that his 
work invites. I will return to Denzin's psychoanalytic reading in more 
detail below. In the meantime, Denzin's interest in Agnes's potential 
'lies' and in how she "had duped the doctors and Garfinkel" (203) 
remains significant in that dishonesty or misrepresentation constitutes 
an established yet hardly flattering way in which to discuss 
transsexuals' self-narratives. 
Bernice Hausman briefly discusses Agnes in the opening 
introduction of her monograph Changing Sex. She is interested in 
Agnes's need to present herself as a straight, feminine woman in 
order to convince medical personnel that she is in need of surgery. 
Later, in her chapter on three 'official' transsexual 
autobiographies, Hausman argues that transsexuals use gender 
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to mask the role of technology in their subject formation . She 
suggests that transsexuals downplay their surgery and exaggerate 
childhood physical and psychological 'indicators' of their 
transsexualism. Hausman suggests that these autobiographies, in 
fact, produce transsexual experience, since they are then used to 
educate other transsexuals as to the appropriate life histories that 
must be constructed and then presented to medical allies in order 
to garner surgery. Hausman discusses such autobiographies as 
aggressive, and exhausting to read, because they "force the reader 
to comply with the author's experience, to begin to interpret his 
or her own life along the same trajectory" (156). Further, she 
accuses the authors of masking bodily resistances to sex-change 
surgery. While denying that she questions the truth behind these 
accounts- since she maintains that she is only showing how they 
are constructed within, and then produce, certain discourses -
Hausman does filter these autobiographies through a hostile lens 
that reflects her later concern with transsexual self-engineering 
(136-40). 
While sociologist Douglas Mason-Schrock ' s study of 
transsexuals' self-narratives does not mention Agnes specifically, 
it does focus on how transsexuals fashion stories for themselves. 
He draws on his own observations - of a self-help group for 
transsexuals, transsexual chat groups on the Internet, and other 
Internet information sources. While recognizing that all people 
use self-narratives, he suggests that transsexuals need particularly 
strong self-narratives as they undergo a radical and stressful 
identity change. With this premise in mind, Mason-Schrock 
examines the process through which transsexuals fashion new 
stories for themselves, a process that involves coaching and 
guidance from the transsexual community. 
Mason-Schrock considers these self-narratives "collective 
creations" (186) . Self-narratives are modeled (e.g., through 
transgender community publications), guided (e.g., by drawing 
out newcomers' stories in transsexual groups), and affirmed (e.g., 
through "urn-hums," nods , and smiles during group meetings). 
Tactful blindness also serves to shape self-narratives: group 
members "affirmed self-narratives by not questioning their 
validity or logical coherence" (189). Mason-Schrock observes 
transsexual self-narratives as examples of how all people frame 
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their lives through narrative to structure a coherent self-identity. 
Nevertheless, again it is the creation of transsexuals' stories that 
gets attention. Mason-Schrock also neglects to contextualize the 
'community coaching' to which he is a witness: transsexuals' 
narratives are formulated in a context where their bodily integrity 
requires that they be able to tell the 'proper,' narrowly defined, and 
rigorously scrutinized story to doctors, in order to garner hormones 
and surgery. 
Jay Prosser also discusses transsexuals' autobiographies, although 
much more sympathetically, suggesting that they indicate agency 
through the capacity to self-represent. Prosser examines 
autobiography as a genre, not limited to transsexuals, that creates a 
coherent subject by reinterpreting the past. The narrative of the 
transsexual's life is key to defining transsexuality and accessing 
surgery. Of course, this archetype also censors other possible, 
legitimate, transsexual tales. Clinicians try to figure out whether a 
person is really transsexual, whether their stories are really true. So 
transsexuals must be convincing storytellers since they are evaluated 
for telling the 'right' story rather than narrating their personal 
experiences. Yet even beyond the clinician's office, Prosser argues, 
autobiography is indispensable as it makes the realization of 
transsexual subjectivity possible. For transsexuals, autobiographies 
provide a way to reconcile a coherent 'I' with a dramatically changing 
biography. Prosser stresses that his analysis does not invalidate 
transsexuals' gender narratives, for such narratives are the only way 
subjects- any subjects- can realize their categorical belonging ( 125). 
Autobiography also undoes the passing by uncovering the transsexual 
history that is hidden by surgery. 
Garfinkel and others assume that Agnes, like other transsexuals, 
is more aware of the strictures of gender than are people who do not 
question their own sex or gender locations. To some observers, the 
gender awareness that Agnes is assumed to possess implies a loss of 
innocence, even a corruption, as she must consciously manipulate 
and occasionally 'lie' to maintain her appearance as a 'natural-born' 
woman. Thus, when Agnes is represented as having agency, she is at 
once read as a manipulative, untrustworthy agent (Hausman) or as 
being strong and self-defining (Prosser; Rogers). On the other hand, 
where she is said not to have agency, Agnes is framed as a "gender 
dupe" who reproduces traditional gender roles (Hausman) 01: as a 
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victim who is painfully caught in the rules of dichotomous gender 
(Rogers) . When truth , selfhood, and agency are considered, 
transsexuals are often perceived to be complicit with traditional gender 
norms, invested in self-presentation and guilty of medical tinkering. 
Certainly Agnes's and other transsexuals' narratives are subject to 
scrutiny. Those who feel more at home in their sexed bodies (a.k.a. 
Garfinkel's "normals"), while equally complicit, more easily elude 
designations of 'gender dupes' who have been fooled by gender 
norms, or 'gender cons' who are trying to dupe the rest of us, by 
virtue of the very presumption that they are 'normal' and of their so-
called 'natural' embeddedness in 'commonsense' gender. 
Examples Are Never Innocent 
In the second part of this paper, I am concerned with how transsexuals, 
as research subjects, are figured in social science discourses. The use 
of case examples, such as interviews, in sociological writing (and 
this essay is no exception) is not objective or disinterested: theoretical, 
political , academic, and personal investments influence the 
presentation of data. I will examine articles by Garfinkel, by Denzin, 
and by Rogers to discuss how Agnes has been variously deployed as 
a textual figure in the interests of such investments. 
I have already discussed Garfinkel's interest in Agnes as an 
example for ethnomethodology. He uses Agnes to show both the social 
embeddedness of everyday practices that produce 'normal' sexuality 
and the methods that Agnes uses to manage her claims of being a 
natural female . For, unlike 'normals,' Agnes had to consciously act 
as 'practical methodologist,' always being prepared to account for 
her actions. 
Garfinkel's intention is to supply an example of ethnomethodology, 
and yet he seems oblivious to his own methods and to the wider 
power relations evident in his interviews. Like Richard Hilbert, 
Garfinkel might defend his chapter by saying that it is about Agnes's 
methods and not his own: "Ethnomethods are not ethnomethodology 's 
research methods but rather its topic of investigation" (Hilbert 264). 
Yet Garfinkel and particularly his masculinity are evident 
throughout the paper, a fact that suggests a need for him to reflect 
upon his own gender performance. Typical of ethnomethodology, 
Garfinkel does not dwell on the power relations confronting Agnes, 
such as the institutional forces constraining Agnes's presentation of 
28 I Raby 
self or his own implication in them. While Garfinkel's stated objective 
is to provide a sympathetic account showing how everyone must do 
gender, Agnes remains constructed by the text as a freak. This is 
supported by detailed biological information and by the occasional 
doubting of the subject's own words. 
Candace West and Don Zimmerman expand on Garfinkel's work 
on ethnomethodology and gender and also use Agnes as an example 
to demonstrate that gender is always present in people, since it is 
constantly produced within everyday activities . Agnes had to learn 
to be a woman while being a woman, "at a time when most people's 
gender would be well-accredited and routinized" ( 131 ). They use the 
example of Agnes to indicate how, on a day-to-day basis, sex is 
signified through sex category, allowing us to determine people's 
sex based on surface appearances. Most people do not look rigorously 
for indicators of sex unless given some reason to doubt. For Agnes, 
as long as people saw a woman, they would not think to doubt. Yet to 
portray a 'normal woman' she had to modify and adjust her behavior 
constantly. 
It is curious that Garfinkel, West and Zimmerman, and even Agnes 
place significant emphasis on the difficulties in performing woman 
when one has been raised a man - that is, treating femininity as 
different and detached from masculinity. Yet masculinity and 
femininity are relational positions. Much of what we learn about 
performing gender comes from the interactions between men and 
women. In fact, as far as Agnes is concerned, her boyfriend Bill 
provides her with just as much information about how to 'be a woman' 
as women do. Further, as C. Jacob Hale observes, 'woman' and 'man' 
are complicated since there are many ways of being men and women, 
and the borders between genders are blurry. These varied gender 
categories change as people age. They also change contextually. 
Certainly, Agnes has an added threat of exposure that most women 
do not have. And yet at the same time, doubt in one's femininity (or 
masculinity) does not suddenly end with the teen years. Parenthood, 
menopause, 'mid-life crises,' and old age are just a few of the more 
obvious periods in life causing possible gender anxiety. Perhaps if 
gender were examined with the assumption that most of us are worried 
about its accomplishment, a similar study could be conducted on 
anyone. In this event, Agnes would no longer seem so unusual. 
Ironically, it is the deconstructionist Denzin whose assertions 
Re-Configuring Agnes I 29 
about "Harold and Agnes" are the most presumptuous. Drawing 
together French thinker Jacques Derrida's position that there is only 
text and Garfinkel's position that the "objective reality of social facts 
is accomplishment" (Garfinkel in Denzin 199), Denzin explores how 
texts become social accomplishments that can be deconstructed. 
Denzin critiques Garfinkel for failing to recognize the "radical turn" 
in his own work. Garfinkel accepts people's accounts of their activities 
as literal, and then interprets these accounts based on his understanding 
of underlying social patterns. While Garfinkel's text is a specific 
production of Agnes, Denzin's own interpretations tell an even more 
imaginative story. 
First, Denzin asserts that Garfinkel oedipalizes his subject, 
regarding Garfinkel like a father (and sometimes even a mother) who 
leads Agnes into femininity. Denzin also considers Garfinkel in the 
position of Agnes's male other: "Garfinkel as author of his text has 
become one with his subject; they are mirror opposites of one another" 
(205). Denzin thus explains the way in which Garfinkel acquires the 
authority to tell Agnes ' s story, presuming that Garfinkel's 
"commonsense understandings of what Agnes did also constitute her 
commonsense understandings" (208). 
Second, Denzin believes there to be a further psychoanalytic 
subtext (or "sexual underside") to Garfinkel's text that, according to 
Denzin, Garfinkel does not address even though it is his own creation. 
Garfinkel fails to "penetrate ... the world of [Agnes's] 'wild' 
sexuality" (209) as the earlier sociologist conflates sexuality and 
gender and, therefore, backs away from examining sexuality itself. 
This subtext is evident to Denzin in Agnes's "Strange Sexual Story" 
(210) in a number of ways: in the oedipal story structure underlying 
the text, in the importance of a sought castration, 1 in the replacement 
of the father with Bill (and Harold), and in transference and 
displacement between Agnes and the doctors. Agnes's sexuality is 
central to Denzin's analysis. 
1 An entire paper could be devoted to how genital surgery is discussed. Denzin 's 
emphasis on Agnes 's castration reflects his psychoanalytic reading. However, this 
term suggests a lack of respect for Agnes's adamant self-identification as a girl. 
Agnes prefers the term "corrective surgery," supporting her position that her original 
sex organs were a mistake that needed to be set right. This position can be contrasted 
with "sex reassignment surgery" which suggests that the individual is a different 
sex prior to surgery. 
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Denzin 's textual production of Agnes begs for its own 
deconstruction (which, to his credit, he acknowledges in a footnote) . 
Denzin recognizes and deconstructs the imaginary separation between 
author, text, and subject which foregrounds authorial investments, 
but he overlays this analysis with his own presumptuous, nonreflexive 
interpretation of Garfinkel's text, including an authoritative, highly 
sexualized description of Agnes. Further, he discusses the constructed 
nature of texts, but demonstrates an ongoing concern with 
apprehending Agnes 's ' real' story, pointing out her ' lies ' and 
questioning Garfinkel's acceptance of Agnes's self-presentation. 
In contrast, Mary Rogers reads Garfinkel's essay through a 
feminist lens that foregrounds the unequal relationship between 
Garfinkel and Agnes. Rogers sees Agnes as a young, working-class 
woman who had to participate in Garfinkel's research to get surgery, 
whereas Garfinkel was not only a professional, but an older male 
who had the authority to grant or to deny Agnes her operation. 
Garfinkel barely recognizes these differences. Further, Rogers charges 
that Garfinkel should be more aware of his own masculine 
phallocentrism (particularly as he tries to present himself as objective). 
Garfinkel fails to consider the importance of other women in Agnes 's 
life . He does not express any concern about Agnes 's turbulent 
relationship with her boyfriend. He places great emphasis on Agnes 's 
presentation as a 'stereotypically attractive' woman. Finally, he 
suggests that Agnes must have gotten sexual pleasure from her penis. 
In sum, Rogers concludes that "Instead of consistently lifting gender 
beyond the commonsense understandings that produce it in everyday 
life, [Garfinkel's work on Agnes] often reproduces that production" 
(Rogers 187). Again, Agnes remains unusual , while Garfinkel passes 
for normal. 
Rogers is one of the few authors who discusses Agnes with an 
eye to how power relations affect both her relations to Garfinkel and, 
more broadly, her day-to-day life. Clearly not all feminists have been 
so sympathetic to transsexual experiences. For example, Janice 
Raymond has been strongly criticized within the transsexual 
community (Califia; Stone) for asserting that transsexuals are not 
real, but artifical constructions that threaten women. Raymond focuses 
on "male-to-constructed-females" and identifies transsexuality as part 
of a patriarchal plot wherein "men [are] wanting to possess females' 
creative energies" (Califia 94). Clearly, Rogers and Raymond present 
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very different kinds of feminism. Rogers's provides an insightful 
analysis of Garfinkel's patriarchal assumptions and of the gender 
relations within Agnes's narrative. However, in the context of this 
particular essay, I wish to draw attention to Rogers's reading ofAgnes 
as yet another interpretation- a feminist one- of Agnes's life. For 
example, Rogers foregrounds Agnes 's social conditions, her relation 
to the researchers, and her relations to women. She believes that Agnes 
Jacks "a strong 'status shield,"' (173) and has "maternal support and 
fast friendships among women" (175) . She interprets Bill as "a 
difficult presence in Agnes 's life" (177) . Rogers 's interpretation of 
Agnes ' s s tory, like my interpretation , is one more interested 
application of Agnes. 
What about Agnes? 
There are multiple stories of Agnes, and Agnes 's representations 
inevitably stand in for her in their multiple forms . Certainly the 
conditions and concerns of transsexuals should be studied and such 
studies will always come with investments. Yet the methods used, 
the intent of such studies, and the everyday material and discursive 
conditions of the lives of transsexuals require attention. 
Some researchers and activists may suggest that to study 
transsexualism properly, one must be a transsexual (Rubin). I disagree. 
In fact, I suggest that assuming respect and self-reflexivity from an 
'insider' is naive, in that it privileges and homogenizes one shared 
identity position. Other identity positions (e.g., class, race, religion, 
personal history, etc.) and different experiences of transsexuality may 
shatter assumptions of shared understanding. Further, transsexuals 
are not immune to 'othering,' and there is no reason to assume they 
should be. Certainly, the conditions and concerns of transsexuals 
should be studied. It is the methods used and the intent of such studies 
that require attention. Ethical self-reflexivity- not insider status- is 
the relevant precursor to research. If transsexuality is to be studied, it 
must be with attention to the social needs of transsexuals and the 
everyday material and discursive conditions of their lives (Namaste 
1996). 
I touch here on the work by Kessler and McKenna, who, like 
Garfinkel, consider transsexualism to "illuminate ... the day-to-day 
social construction of gender by all persons" (Kessler & McKenna 
112). Yet, these researchers do not only focus on transsexuality. They 
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employ innovative research, such as a gender game, to demonstrate 
how everyone ascribes gender, and how it is done in a way that privileges 
certain gender markers (specifically the penis) over others. 
Kessler and McKenna consider transsexuality as fashioned to fit 
into the 'natural attitude' or commonsense assumptions about gender. 
This natural attitude permeates medical, legal, and popular discourses, 
which shape how a transsexual must present him- or herself. Kessler 
and McKenna posit, in fact, that most 'gender work' is done by those 
perceiving gender, rather than those displaying it. Perceivers hold 
the natural attitude and filter behavior through the initial assigned 
gender. Henry Rubin has interpreted Kessler and McKenna as being 
critical of transsexuals for being "misguided and ill-informed" in their 
reaffirmation of the 'natural attitude'. He also claims that they believe 
transsexual experience to "lack a proper degree of feminist political 
awareness" (272). I disagree, for Kessler and McKenna broaden the 
range of 'gender dupes' considerably by showing how all people are 
embedded in the social. In direct contrast, to hold transsexuals like 
Agnes responsible for gender, as Hausman does, is much more 
troubling since this amounts to misdirected scapegoating.2 
Finally, if social scientists are going to study the lives of 
transsexuals, attention needs to be paid to the lived experiences and 
material conditions of their subjects in a dichotomously gendered 
culture that is often hostile and discriminatory toward those who are 
ambiguously gendered. Namaste ( 1996) wonders why queer theorists 
ignore the daily realities of transsexuals' lives. I argue that the same 
can be asked of sociological research. Gender-bashing and transphobia 
are rarely discussed, nor are the economic and personal consequences 
of such discrimination. Instead, transsexuals and other so-called 
'deviants' are often exoticized and 'othered' through academic texts 
that are privileged in knowledge production. Rather than reproducing 
this framing of transsexuality, and using it as a lens for understanding 
the nonmarginal, activist researchers must disrupt these assumptions 
of 'normal' and 'deviant'. 
In this paper I have questioned the construction of Agnes. In 
'Kessler and McKenna also devote an appendix to "Rachel," a male-to-female 
transsexual, reproducing letters that she wrote to the researchers. Here we have access 
both to Rachel's self-expression and to how it is interpreted by Kessler and McKenna, 
thus opening up the interpretive process to readers . 
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particular, I have used Agnes as a lens through which we can 
contemplate both the process of 'othering' and the act of self-
reflexivity within sociological theorizing. This paper is framed 
through my selective reading of the texts, one that focuses more on 
the examples used than the theories illustrated, for the way in which 
examples are framed is integral to the ethical and political implications 
of our theorizing. 
Many thanks to the following individuals for their generous comments 
on various drafts of this paper: Kathryn Payne, Nancy Cook, Beth 
Jackson, Sheila Cavanagh, Lorna Weir, Trish Salah, Susan Goldberg, 
Rachel Nash, and Rob Gill. 
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